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1 Introduction
Banks entrap us in a crisis again. But could we get rid of them? The question sounds absurd,
given the banks are providing some indispensable services, such as screening and monitoring.
However, the services could be alternatively provided in separation from the intermediation of
fund ow, with funds owing directly from investors to entrepreneurs; so the service providers
are specialists, not banks. Imagine factor owners, namely investors, the services providers and
entrepreneurs, as atoms. Financial Intermediation (FI) is a molecule with a specic arrangement
of the atoms. Could we nevertheless arrange them into other molecules where investors and the
service providers are both connected to entrepreneurs only? Indeed, for the service of reducing
entrepreneursprivate benets, these two types of modes have been recognized by Holmstrom
and Tirole (1997), who, however, fail to distinguish them in economic sense. This paper is the
rst to suggest that the key is to consider who takes the liability to repay investors. Where
it is taken by the service provider alone, the mode is FI and the provider is the bank; where
entrepreneurs take the liability by some means, the mode is of direct nance and the service
provider is a specialist. The way of fund ow hallmarks the allocation of the liability.
The paper considers the economics of the allocation of the liability in an economy where
investors resort to costly auditing to verify entrepreneursoutputs.1 However, the outputs can
be cheaply observed by an expert, Ms X, through monitoring. There are two entrepreneurs, each
with a project. Suppose rst they are nanced independently, in the state of one only having
succeeded, the failed one declares default and is audited, at the auditing costs. Consider then
the mode of FI, where Ms X runs a bank that nances both entrepreneurs and is nanced by
investors. In the above state, if the repayment from the successful entrepreneur su¢ ces for the
bank to clear its liability to the investors, the bank is not audited, and it does not audit the
1Townsend (1979) studies the contractual problem with this type of friction for the rst time. Mookerjee and
Png (1989) extend it considering the case with stochastic auditing strategies.
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failed entrepreneur, as Ms X knows through monitoring of his actual failure. Compared to the
mode of independent nance, therefore, auditing is saved under FI in the above state.2
However, besides independent nance and FI, there are other modes of nancing. The paper
exhausts all such modes. The real race is between FI and a mode called "Conglomeration", under
which the entrepreneurs and Ms X form a conglomerate, each entrepreneur running a division,
Ms X running the headquarters to monitor the divisions and advise them of how much each
should contribute to clear the liability of the whole conglomerate. If funds from one successful
division su¢ ce to clear the whole liability, auditing happens only in state 0, when both divisions
(entrepreneurs) have failed, as under FI.
As mentioned above, the two modes are di¤erentiated by who is liable to repay the investors.
It is Ms X alone under FI, while the entrepreneurs jointly under Conglomeration. The assets of
the liability taker are the collateral upon which the investors hold claims. Thus, the collateral is
the bank asset under FI, and the pool of all the projects under Conglomeration. In this economy,
an asset partaking the collateral has three implications. I, the investors audit it when default
is declared; II, they appropriate all its revenues whenever auditing uncovers any fraud in the
declaration; III, before the investors are satised, not a bit of the asset can be disposed of. These
three implications determine the economics of the allocation of the liability.
According to implication I, when default is declared, the investors audit one bank asset
under FI, but two entrepreneur-projects under Conglomeration. Thus, organizing FI reduces
the number of assets to be audited from Two to One. Therefore, FI has "Number Advantage".
To see the disadvantage of FI, assume the investors use stochastic rather than determin-
2Diamond (1984) is the rst to show that FI dominates the mode of independent nance due to this kind
of cost savings. Following him, Williamson (1986), Krasa and Villamil (1992) and Hellwig (2000) among others
discuss the optimal contracts of the bank under various circumstances. But none of them (including Diamond)
considers alternative nancial modes that also accomodate monitoring service and implement the cost savings.
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istic auditing strategies. According to implication II, the collateral is appropriated to punish
misreporting default. The more the collateral worth, the harsher the punishment, and hence
the smaller the probability auditing is needed. The revenues of the bank asset come from the
returns of the projects. Hence, the collateral under FI is always worth less than that under
Conglomeration. Conglomeration thus has "Collateral Advantage".
Can both advantages be materialized simultaneously by the hybrid mode of auditing Ms Xs
pocket only but appropriating all the projects as the punishment for cheating? No. In the hybrid
mode, the entrepreneurs would always declare default, ll nothing into Ms Xs pocket (which is
thus to be audited), and promise to share the revenues of the projects with her after the auditing.
According to implication III, the revenues are kept untouched during the auditing and are then
ready to be shared afterwards. Thus, in the hybrid mode, this promise is credible and the
collusion works. On the contrary, this promise is incredible under FI, where the entrepreneurs
are free to dispose of what remains as soon as the bank declares the clearance of their liabilities
to it. Hence, when the bank is being audited, they will dispose of all the revenues, leaving
nothing to Ms X.
Therefore, the race of FI against Conglomeration, for the two-entrepreneur case, is decided by
the strength of Number Advantage relative to Collateral Advantage. If and only if the number
advantage is large enough, FI arises in equilibrium.
The comparison between the two modes is extended to the case of a large number of entre-
preneurs. The two-entrepreneur case bears two costs: in state 0, auditing still happens since the
liability to investors is not repaid, and in state 2, Ms X obtains rent since she is paid by two suc-
cessful entrepreneurs while one payment su¢ ces to clear the liability to the investors. Both costs
are worn away when the number of entrepreneurs goes to innity, because by the law of large
numbers, on average the number of successes is almost xed, and hence both the probability of
the liability to investors not being fully repaid and that of Ms X acquiring rents go to 0. This
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argument is independent of the organization of monitoring service and is equally applicable to
FI and Conglomeration. Therefore, both modes implement this benet of diversication, which,
therefore, does not drive FI, as Diamond (1984) claimed and the literature well accepted.
Two comparative statics results hold true for both cases. First, the larger the size of the
projects, the greater the collateral advantage of Conglomeration, hence the less the chance they
are nanced by the bank.
Second, the chance of FI arising in equilibrium increases with monitoring costs. When the
costs increase, entrepreneurs have to raise the repayment to the bank (Ms X) as compensation,
which increase the value of the bank asset, and thus reduces the relative collateral advantage
of Conglomeration.3 Monitoring costs are the expenses with which a nancial expert acquires
soft information on a project, and hence measure the complexity of the project in particular and
of the economic system in general. The comparative static result, therefore, predicts that over
time, the prevalence of FI is growing and that of Conglomeration shrinking.4
This comparative static result is derived only if FI has been compared to Conglomeration
(besides others); under both modes monitoring is provided. In fact, monitoring costs must
disadvantage FI in Diamond (1984) and the literature following him, which compare FI only to
independent nance, a mode involving no monitoring.
3For two-entrepreneur case, Bond (2004) endogenizes several modes of nancing with a similar friction. One
di¤erence is in the information technology. In his paper, the disclosure costs are proportional to the number of
agents to whom the truth is disclosed, while they are constant here. As a result, the driving force is to raise more
investors into senior classes in that paper, while it is the trade-o¤ between the two advantages in this paper and
seniority plays no role. And because of that information technology, Bonds paper does not address the allocation
of the liability to repay investors. Moreover, his paper does not derive the comparative static result with respect
to monitoring costs.
4Diaz-Gimenez et al (1992) reports, in their table 3a, that the ratio to GNP of value added by the banking
sector is increasing over 1950-1989. The tide of non-nancial corporation spin-o¤s in recent decades is another
suggestive evidence.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the model. Section 3 rst
exhausts all the possible allocations of the liability and then examines them one by one. Section
4 considers the case of a large number of entrepreneurs. Section 5 concludes. Technical proofs
are relegated to the appendices.
2 The Model
Agents and Production
There are two dates, T0 for investment and T1 for return, and three classes of risk neutral
agents: entrepreneurs, investors, and experts.
There are two entrepreneurs, E1 and E2, and each has an independent and identical project.
A project needs a unit capital to invest, and returns R with probability q; and nothing with
probability 1   q. All entrepreneurs are penniless at T0. There are innite potential investors,
each of whom has a small amount of capital, but the aggregate capital is well su¢ cient to nance
all the projects. Experts have neither physical capital nor projects, but have the human capital
of monitoring, the meaning of which will be clear soon. There are many experts. Nevertheless
an entrepreneur can only accommodate one expert.
All agents are protected by limited liability, and no one discounts across the two dates.
Entrepreneurs have all the bargaining power, that is, equilibrium will be driven by maximizing
their expected prots.
Information Structure and Technologies
The only friction to nance a project is that only the entrepreneur costlessly observes its
outcome, success or failure. For others to nd out the outcome, two information technologies are
available, with di¤erent costs and information strength. The weak technology is monitoring. If
an expert has been monitoring a project from T0 on, then she knows its outcome at T1 through
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her personal experience, but she is not able to convince others of what she knows. The strong
technology is auditing, which discloses the outcome to the public after it is realized. Accordingly,
the monitoring costs per project, denoted by m; are much less than the auditing costs, denoted
by C: Only experts know how to monitor, but the investors can access auditing, provided they
a¤ord C collectively.5
An expert can observe the outcome of a project at minor costs. If she never colludes with the
entrepreneur, the investors can simply rely on her word of mouth to know the outcome and the
unobservability of the outcome is not a problem any more. To exclude such a trivial solution,
this paper is going to allow all possible collusion between the expert and the entrepreneurs. For
that purpose, it is assumed that any side transfers between some or all of these non-investors are
costlessly observable to none but the parties involved. The problem of collusion plainly precludes
Maskin-Moore-Repullo mechanisms from functioning in this economy. Therefore, monitoring
adds no value to a single entrepreneur. Together with the restraint of only one expert for one
entrepreneur, it follows that if monitoring service is provided at all, it is provided by one expert
only who monitors both entrepreneurs. This expert is called Ms X hereinafter.
Denote by C2  C the costs of auditing Ms Xs account. For simplicity, it is assumed that the
action of monitoring is contractible, since the according moral hazard problem is not a necessary
part of this paper.
A metaphor may be helpful. Assume each of the entrepreneurs and Ms X has a box (or
pocket). An entrepreneur knows what is in his box, but cannot see into other boxes. Ms X
knows what is in her box and can also see into an entrepreneur-box at minor costs m: The
investors have to spend C to open an entrepreneurs box, and C2 to open Ms Xs box.
Additional assumptions are laid out below.
5Notice that here the auditing costs do not vary with the number of the agents to whom the truth is disclosed,
as is assumed by Bond (2004).
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Assumption 1: At T0 the investors commit to playing a stochastic auditing strategy.
The investors are able to commit, since the action and the costs of auditing are veriable and
thus the investors have no di¢ culty in overcoming the collective action problem in connection
with the commitment. Hereinafter, they will be dealt with as one party. This assumption of
commitment facilitates the approach of mechanism design. Without it, I have to analyze a two-
stage game, which is technically more complicated, but the main insights of this paper will be
passed on. The other point of Assumption 1 is that the investors exercise auditing stochastically,
which is the same as in Mookerjee and Png (1989), but di¤erent from in Diamond (1984). This
assumption of stochastic auditing not only facilitates the mechanism design approach, but also
uncovers the indispensable role of monitoring (see the remark following Lemma 2).
Assumption 2: S  qR  (1  q)C  1; (1  q)C  qR
2
; and 0 < m < (1 q)q
2RC
(q2R+2(1 q)S)S :
Basically S is the "surplus" of a project and S  1 ensures it is worthy of being nanced. The
other parts of the assumption ensure that the auditing costs are signicant enough to leverage
up various modes of nancing, and that monitoring is of costs so low as to be provided in
equilibrium.
Assumption 3: Securities issued to investors must bear repayments that weakly increase
with the economic fundamental.
That is, the investors are repaid more when more projects succeed and the overall state of
the economy is better. This is a feature of realistic securities. This assumption restricts the
feasible sets of contracts to investors, and simplies the problems of nding optimal contracts.
Timing
T0 Morning: The entrepreneurs cooperatively decide how to get nanced.6 They decide
6At this time, they act as one and the same designer. I abstract away the game probably played between them
at this time, as it would be very complicated to take it into account. For example, one entrepreneurs contracts
could be contingent on the others, and vice versa, resulting in a problem of innite recursiveness.
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who takes the liability to repay investors and thus what the collateral is. Then they design
accordingly the contractual arrangement (the mechanism) between them and the investors, and
Ms X if the monitoring service is used. Only symmetric mechanisms are considered.
T0 Afternoon: The securities are issued to investors. After buying the securities, they
commit to a stochastic auditing strategy.
T1 Morning: The outcomes of all the projects are realized. Non-investors could arrange
various sorts of collusion.
T1 Afternoon: The liable entity reports the performance of the collateral to the investors
and is ready to repay them accordingly. Contingent on the report, they audit the collateral
according to the committed strategy, and if the auditing uncovers any fraud in the report, they
appropriate the whole collateral.7
The Liability and the Collateral
The mode of nancing is decided by who takes the liability to repay investors in this economy.
The investors hold claims upon the revenues of the assets of the liability taker(s); these assets
are thus the collateral to secure the claims. In this economy, the fact that an asset partakes the
collateral has three implications, as follows:
I, the investors audit it contingent on the report of the performance of the collateral;
II, they appropriate the whole asset whenever auditing uncovers any fraud in the report;
III, any bit of the asset cannot be disposed of before the investors are satised, that is, either
their claims are fully repaid, or they nish auditing and appropriation.
7Any securities to the investors must entail the rights to audit the collateral and furthermore to appropriate
a part or the whole of it whenever auditing uncovers a fraud, because this is the only way to incentivize truth-
reporting. Ex ante, the harsher the punishment, the lower the incentive to lie, and hence the less the auditing
needed. This benets the entrepreneurs, for the price of the securities has to ex ante compensate the auditing
costs the investors expect to incur. In equilibrium, therefore, the securities will entail the maximum punishment,
that is, a fraud triggers the appropriation of the whole collateral.
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Implication III follows from the general principle that the debtor has rights to dispose of the
collateral that secures the claims of the creditor only if the liability is declared to have been
cleared. These three implications decide the economics of the allocation of the liability to repay
investors in this economy.
In the next section, all the modes are listed, examined one by one, and compared to nd the
equilibrium mode.
3 The Modes of Financing
3.1 All the Possible Modes
Based on the allocation of the liability, we can envisage the following modes.
(1) Independent Finance (IF): each project is nanced independently and is the collateral
upon which the entrepreneur takes the liability to repay its investors.
(2) Joint Liability without Monitoring: the entrepreneurs, without using the monitoring
service, take the joint liability to repay all the investors upon the pool of all the projects. That
is, so long as one project has succeeded, all the investors are repaid with its revenues. This
mode, as will be shown, is equivalent to IF.
(3) FI: Ms X alone takes the liability to repay all the investors, upon the bank asset that is
formed by her investment in the projects.
(4) Conglomeration: the liability is taken upon the pool of all the projects by a conglomerate,
where each project is a division managed by the entrepreneur and Ms X runs the headquarters
monitoring the divisions. Conglomeration di¤ers from mode (2) in monitoring being provided.
(5) The mix mode: the liable entity consists of Ms X and one entrepreneur, and both runs
his project and nances the other projects as the intermediary. The collateral then consists of
the directly nanced project and the intermediary asset.
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We may wonder if the modes listed above exhaust all the possibilities of nancial modes.
The following lemma answers this question.
Lemma 1 Modes (1)-(5) exhaust all the possible modes of nancing.
Proof. Consider what the collateral could be. The funds to repay the investors, in the end,
come from the revenues of the projects, either directly from them, or indirectly from the asset
invested in them, or from the asset mixed with these two types of assets. For the rst case, either
the two projects become two separate collateral assets, which gives rise to mode (1), under which
monitoring is useless; or the two projects are pooled into one collateral asset, which gives rise to
modes (4) or (2), depending on whether monitoring is provided or not. The second case, where
the investment in the projects forms the collateral asset, leads to FI, where the intermediary
must be an expert (Ms X) because of the information advantage. This gives rise to thus mode
(3). In the mixed case, the collateral asset consists of one project plus the intermediary asset
in the other. Again, only Ms X can sensibly be the intermediary. Thus, the liability is taken
jointly by her and the entrepreneur of the directly nanced project, which is exactly mode (5).
Below, the optimal mechanism of each mode of (1) through (4) is derived. Then these
modes are compared in the last subsection, where the mix mode is shown to be dominated by
Conglomeration.
3.2 IF and Joint Liability without Monitoring
Under IF, each project is nanced independently and is the collateral for the investors who nance
the project. A project has two states, success and failure. Only in the state of success are the
investors repaid, and the amount of the repayment, denoted by d; denes the security. If the
entrepreneur reports a failure, the investors audit the project with probability l. A mechanism
is then represented by (d; l).
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In the state of success, if the entrepreneur reports the truth, he lays out d to clear his liability.
If he lies and claims to have failed, with probability l; the project is audited, which uncovers the
fraud and causes the whole revenue, R; to be appropriated; with probability 1   l; the project
is not audited and he escapes the liability. Thus, he expects to lose lR if lying. The incentive
compatibility constraint (IC) for the entrepreneur to honestly report the success, therefore, is
d  lR:
With probability q the project succeeds and the investors are repaid with d:With probability
1  q it fails, and the investors get repaid with nothing, and incur costs C to audit the project
with probability l. Thus, the expected benet of nancing the project is qd  (1  q)lC; and the
individual rationality constraint (IR) is 1  qd  (1  q)lC:
Each entrepreneur chooses (d; l) to minimize d subject to the IC and IR above. Both con-
straints are binding in the optimization. Therefore, the optimal mechanism, denoted by fdI ; lIg;
is fR
S
; 1
S
); where S  qR  (1  q)C  1 by Assumption 3.
We turn to mode (2). It arranges joint liability, which alone seems to be able to save auditing
costs: if the liability of a failed project is repaid by the other entrepreneur, the project is saved
from being audited. This benet of cross-subsidization is nevertheless not implemented by mode
(2), as is shown below.
The collateral under mode (2) is the pool of the two projects. It has 3 states, state s = 0; 1,
and 2; dened by the number of successful projects, occurring with probabilities (1 q)2; 2q(1 q);
and q2 respectively. A symmetric mechanism of the mode is represented by fDs; lsgs=1;2: in
state s > 0; the investors are repaid with Ds, to which each successful entrepreneur equally
contributes Ds
s
; and a (reportedly) failed project is audited with probability ls: A successful
entrepreneur, if telling truthfully his success, expects to outlay dJ = (1   q)D1 + qD22 : If lying,
his project is audited with probability lJ = (1   q)l0 + ql1. Then, the IC is lJR  dJ : The IR
is 2q(1  q)D1 + q2D2  2 + C((1  q)2  2l0 + 2q(1  q)  l1); of which the left hand side (LHS)
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equals 2qdJ and the right hand side (RHS) equals 2+2lJC: It follows, together with the IC, that
lJ  1
qR (1 q)C = l
I : Thus, a failed project is audited with a probability no less than lI under
mode (2), which thus saves no auditing costs. On the other hand, mode (2) is not worse than
IF, since joint liability bears as a special case independent liability. Therefore, the two modes
are equivalent. To summarize,
Lemma 2 Under IF a successful entrepreneur outlays dI = R
S
: Mode (2) is equivalent to IF,
that is, monitoring is indispensable to implements the benet of cross subsidization.
The assumption of stochastic auditing is crucial to the indispensability of monitoring, which is
not the case, if only deterministic auditing is allowed. Here is an example. Consider the following
mechanism of mode (2): D2 = 2D1 = 2D; l0 = 1; l1 = l2 = 0: The IR is qD  1 + (1  q)2C and
the IC is (1   q)R  D: If q(1   q)R  1 + (1   q)2C , (1   q)S  1; there exists a range of
(q; R; C) with which the IR and the IC are satised and hence auditing occurs only in state 0
under mode (2), which is this benet of cross subsidization.
Monitoring helps implement that benet, for the following reason. Exactly because joint
liability makes a failed project less likely audited, it gives a successful entrepreneur higher in-
centive to hide his success. This incentive compatibility problem dissipates all the benet of
cross subsidization under stochastic auditing. Where Ms X knows the outcome of each project
through monitoring, an entrepreneur has to buy her silence to hide the success, which lessens
the incentive to lie.
There are various modes of accommodating the monitoring service. First, as presumed by
Diamond (1984), there is the mode of FI, which is examined in the next subsection.
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3.3 FI
Under this mode, Ms X becomes the bank and takes the liability to repay all the investors, upon
the bank asset. At T1, she reports how much funds she has collected from the entrepreneurs.
Contingent on this report, the investors audit the bank asset with the committed probability at
cost C2  C:
Denition 1 FI has a "Number Advantage" if C2 < 2C:
The total costs of auditing the two projects are 2C: C2 < 2C means banking technically saves
auditing costs. This cost saving is called "Number Advantage", as it owes to the fact that the
bank sets up a unied book of all its assets and rationalizes the book. the number advantage
can be measured by 2C
C2
.8
In this subsection, the marks of some equations are su¢ xed with "b" to indicate that they
are peculiar to the mode of FI, where Ms X is the "b"ank.
The economy has three states, s = 0; 1; and 2; as the collateral of mode (2) has, occurring
with probabilities (1  q)2; 2q(1  q); and q2 respectively. A general asset contract of the bank is
fdsgs=0;1;2; and a liability contract is fDsgs=0;1;2 : in state s; each successful entrepreneur repays
Ms X (the bank) with ds and she then passes Ds to the investors. At T0; the investors, facing
fds; Dsgs=0;1;2; commit to auditing the bank with probability ls when state s is reported. A
mechanism is thus fds; Ds; lsgs=0;1;2:
By limited liability for Ms X and the entrepreneurs,
D0 = d0 = 0; D1  d1  R and D2  2d2  2R (LL)
Consider the ICs for the bank to truthfully report the revenues of its asset. We only present
the binding ICs here, which are those that prevent the bank from misreporting state s to s  1
8Note that no number advantage is assumed by Diamond (1996), where the costs are the destruction of the
low output, L; and thus C = L and C2 = 2L:
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for s = 2; 1. The non-binding constraints are put in the appendix.
In state 2, the bank repays the investors with D2 if honoring the contracts. If instead it lies
that the state is 1, then, with probability l1; the bank is audited and the whole asset, worth 2d2
in the state, is appropriated, and with probability 1  l1; the reported state (s = 1) is accepted
as the truth and accordingly the bank outlays D1 to the investors. The IC for the bank not to
misreport state 2 to 1 is, thus,
l1  2d2 + (1  l1)D1  D2 (G21b)
The IC for the bank not to misreport state 2 to 0, (G20b), is not binding.
In state 1, misreporting it to state 2 is never protable, since by Assumption 3, D2  D1:
Therefore, l2 = 0. If the bank lies that the state is 0, it expects to lose the whole asset, now
worth d1; with probability l0; and nothing otherwise. Thus, the IC for it not to misreport state
1 to 0 is
l0d1  D1 (G10b)
The investors obtain D1 and D2 in states 1 and 2 respectively. They audit the bank in states
0 and 1. The IR for the investors is
q2D2 + 2q(1  q)D1  2 + [(1  q)2l0 + 2q(1  q)l1]C2 (IR-Ib)
Facing the bank contract 	  fds; Dsgs=0;1;2; the investors commit to the strategy flsgs=0;1;2
that minimizes the auditing costs (the second term of the RHS of (IR-Ib)) subject to the ICs
and IR above. Denote the optimal strategy by flBs (	)gs=0;1;2: As mentioned above, lB2 (	) = 0:
The ICs above guarantee the investors not worse o¤ by any fraud, but do not prevent a
successful entrepreneur from being exploited by Ms X through partial collusion.9 In state 2, she
may arrange collusion in which she collects t < d2 from E1 to buy his silence when she declares
9A failed entrepreneur has nothing to be exploited. The collusion is qualied with "partial" since it does not
involve all the three non-investors.
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state 1 to the investors and E2. With the collusion, she collects d1 from E2; besides t from
E1; and repays the investors with D1; but only with probability 1   l1, when this fraud is not
uncovered by auditing; without the collusion, she gain 2d2   D2 in net. The IC for no partial
collusion in state 2 is, thus, 2d2  D2  (1  l1)(d1 + t D1) for any t < d2. Equivalently,
2d2  D2  (1  l1)(d1 + d2  D1) (P2b)
The IC for no partial collusion in state 1, (P1b), is not binding.
The investors do not care how the bank deals with the entrepreneurs and thus do not take
into account (P2b) and (P1b) when choosing the auditing strategy. However, the entrepreneurs
can alleviate the problem of partial collusion by inducing more auditing: the higher is l1; the
looser is (P2b).
Lastly, Ms X incurs costs to monitor the two projects. The IR for her is
q2(2d2  D2) + 2q(1  q)(d1  D1)  2m (IR-X)
The entrepreneursproblem is then as follows.
Problem 1 minfds;Ds;lsgs=0;1;2 2q(1  q)d1 + q2  2d2, subject to
(1): ls = lBs (	) for s = 0; 1; 2, where 	  fds; Dsgs=0;1;2:
(2): (LL), (P2b), (P1b), (IR-X), and D1  D2.
The solution depends on whether (IR-X) is binding or not. If not, we have the following
lemma. Let B  2+(1 q)2C2
2q q2
Lemma 3 The optimal mechanism of FI is D1 = D2 = d1 = d2 = B, and l0 = 1 and l1 = l2 = 0;
if m < 1
2
q2B when (IR-X) is not binding.
Proof. See the appendix.
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l1 = 0 is driven by the trade-o¤ between auditing costs and the rent to Ms X. She obtains
the rent because she is the only one who knows of the overall state before auditing. However,
auditing discloses this information to the public and thereby reduces her information advantage.
Thus, the more auditing is exercised, the less rent she gains. Auditing costs have been assumed
large enough so that the entrepreneurs would like gives Ms X a net rent of V B = q2B  2m; but
triggers auditing only in state 0.
l1 = 0 implies D1 = D2  D by (G21b); thus the liability contract is debt. Together with
all these, the binding (P2b) implies that d1 = d2  d; which is presumed in Diamond (1984,
1996), but is driven by the partial collusion problem here. To nd l0; substitute D1 = D2 = l0d
((G10b)) into the binding (IR-Ib),
l0 =
2
(2q   q2)d  (1  q)2C2 (1)
It is a decreasing function of d: Economically, with d increasing, the value of the collateral under
FI (the bank asset) increases. The collateral is appropriated as the punishment for cheating;
hence the more the collateral is worth, the less the auditing is needed, that is, the smaller the l0.
When (IR-X) is not binding, l0 can be moved freely. As d decreases with l0 by (1), it is
minimized at l0 = 1; which together with (1) implies d = B: So we have lemma 3 above.
If m  1
2
q2B, (IR-X) is binding, so V B = 0: With the concern for the rent to X removed,
the driving force is to minimize auditing costs alone. Therefore, l1 = 0. It follows that D1 = D2
and as above, d1 = d2 = d; which altogether implies (1). d is now pinned down by (1) and
q2(2d   dl0) + 2q(1   q)(d   dl0) = 2m; derived from the binding (IR-X). Let d  dB(m). It
strictly increases with m; intuitively, with monitoring costs increasing, the more is needed to
pay the bank in order to satisfy its IR. And d is independent of R; indeed R is present neither
in the constraints nor in the objective. Then, through (1), l0 = lB(m)  2(2q q2)dB(m) (1 q)2C2 is
strictly decreasing with m and independent of R.
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To summarize the two case, let us extend to dene dB(m) = B for m < 1
2
q2B, so d = dB(m)
and l0 = lB(m) always. And CB  (1   q)2C2lB(m) always denote the expected auditing
costs under FI. Then V B = max(0; q2 2+C
B
2q q2   2m) always.10 With these notations, the optimal
mechanism of FI is summarized as follows.
Proposition 1 Under FI, a successful entrepreneur outlays dB(m) as dened above, and the
bank is audited only in state 0, with probability lB(m) = 2
(2q q2)dB(m) (1 q)2C2 ; which is decreasing
with m and independent of R; and Ms X obtains net rent of V B = max(0; q2 2+C
B
2q q2   2m):
3.4 Conglomeration
Under this mode, the liability is taken by a conglomerate, where each project becomes a division
run by the entrepreneur, and monitored by Ms X, who becomes the headquarters. Here funds
could ow, in a di¤erent way from under FI, directly between investors and the entrepreneurs.
However, this di¤erence does not matter at all. To highlight this point, we suppose Ms X
also intermediates for the ow of funds under Conglomeration, collecting and distributing the
investment capital at T0 and the repayment funds at T1; she may be regarded as the chief
nancial o¢ cer of the conglomerate. Then, the only di¤erence between Conglomeration and FI,
therefore, is in the collateral, and all the other respects are the same.
In this section, the marks of some equations are su¢ xed with "h" to indicate that they are
peculiar to the mode of Conglomeration, where Ms X becomes the "h"eadquarters.
Parallel to the former subsection, a mechanism is fds; Ds; lsgs=0;1;2: in state s; as under FI,
a successful entrepreneur contributes ds to Ms X, who repays Ds to the investors on behalf of
the conglomerate; ls has a di¤erent meaning: l0 (l2) is the probability of auditing each project
if state 0 (2) is reported and l1 the probability of auditing the reportedly failed project if state
10When m  12q2B, q2 2+C
B
2q q2  q2 2+(1 q)
2C2
2q q2 = q
2B  2m:
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1 is reported.11 The limited liability constraint is still (LL), as under FI.
Consider the ICs for the liable entity, the conglomerate now, to truthfully report the state
to the investors. Again, we only present the binding ICs here, which are those that prevent the
conglomerate from misreporting state s to s   1 for s = 2; 1. The non-binding constraints are
put in the appendix.
In state 2, the conglomerate outlays D2 if honoring the contracts. If it lies that the state is
1, then with probability l1; the reportedly failed project is audited, the fraud uncovered, and the
conglomerate loses 2R; otherwise it outlays D1; according to the reported state. The IC for the
conglomerate not to misreport state 2 as state 1 is, thus,
l1  2R + (1  l1) D1  D2 (G21h)
The IC preventing misreporting state 2 as state 0, (G20h), is not binding.
Similarly, in state 1, the IC for the conglomerate not to misreport it as state 0 is
l0R  D1 (G10h)
Misreporting state 1 as state 2 is never protable, as under FI, and thus l2 = 0:
The investors audit two projects in state 0 and one in state 1. The IR for them is
q2D2 + 2q(1  q)D1  2 + [(1  q)2  2l0 + 2q(1  q)l1]C: (IR-Ih)
The investors, facing the security 	  fDsgs=0;1;2; commit to the auditing strategy that
minimizes the expected auditing costs subject to the the ICs and the IR above. Let the optimal
strategy be flHs (	)gs=0;1;2: We saw lH2 (	) = 0:
11If the report is fs; fg (project 1 succeeds and 2 fails), the truth is either fs; fg or fs; sg: In other words, if
the truth is ff; fg or ff; sg; there is no incentive to misreport it to be fs; fg: Thus, only the reportedly failed
project needs to be audited in state 1.
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Move on to consider partial collusion, which the investors do not take into account when
deciding the auditing strategy. In state 2, Ms X obtains 2d2 D2 if honoring the contracts. She
could arrange partial collusion in which she collects t < d2 from E1 to buy his silence when she
declares state 1 to the investors and E2. With the collusion, she obtains (t + d1  D1)(1   l1).
Previously, under FI, E1 gained in net d2   t from the collusion, even if her lying had been
uncovered, since his pocket was not subject to appropriation by the banks investors. On the
contrary, it is subject now under Conglomeration; thus he obtains (1   l1)(R   t) with the
collusion, and R d2 without. The IC for no partial collusion in state 2 is, therefore, 2d2 D2 
(1  l1)(t+ d1  D1) for any t such that (1  l1)(R  t)  R  d2 . Equivalently,
d2 +R D2  (1  l1)(d1 +R D1) (P2h)
The IC for no partial collusion in state 1, (P1h), is not binding.
Lastly, the IR to Ms X is (IR-X), the same as under FI, since she obtains the di¤erence
between the paid-in and the paid-out in the same way. The entrepreneursproblem is then:
Problem 2 minfds;Ds;lsgs=0;1;2 2q(1  q)d1 + q2  2d2, subject to
(1): ls = lHs (	) for s = 0; 1; 2, where 	 = fDsgs=0;1;2.
(2): (LL), (P2h), (P1h), (IR-X), and D1  D2 (Assumption 3).
Again, the solution depends on whether (IR-X) is satised or not. If not, we have the
following. Let H  2R
q2R+2(1 q)S :
Lemma 4 The optimal mechanism of Conglomeration is: D1 = D2 = d1 = d2 = H; l0 =
2
q2R+2(1 q)S ; l1 = l2 = 0; if m <
1
2
q2H:
Proof. See the appendix.
Again, the mechanism is driven by the trade-o¤ between the auditing costs and the rent
to Ms X, and as the former has been assumed large enough, the optimal mechanism triggers
auditing only in state 0 (l1 = 0); but gives Ms X net rent of V H = q2H   2m.
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The di¤erence is that, here l0 = 2q2R+2(1 q)S decreases with R, but the counterpart under FI
l0 = 1 is independent of R. This is due to the di¤erence in the collateral, which is the pool of
the projects under Conglomeration and the bank asset under FI. The higher is R; the more is
the collateral under Conglomeration worth and hence the less is the auditing needed. Under FI,
if the entrepreneurs want to similarly lower l0 by increasing the value of the collateral, they have
to ll more into the bank asset, which they denitely dislike; rather they pick l0 = 1:
The same line of argument applies for the case where the IR for X is binding. In this case,
under FI, the entrepreneurs have to pay more to the bank, which, we showed, raises the bank
assets value and thus pushes down l0: On the contrary, under Conglomeration, the collaterals
value is independent of m; and so is l0: thus, l0 = lH  2q2R+2(1 q)S , no matter if (IR-X) is
binding.
As under FI, d(= d1 = d2) is pinned down by the binding (IR-X) for this case: d = H+(mq  
qH
2
) for m  1
2
q2H: The increment, m
q
  qH
2
; pays for the part of the monitoring costs that is not
o¤set by the gross rent, q2H:
To summarize, let CH  2(1  q)2ClH denote the expected auditing costs under Conglomer-
ation. From the binding (IR-Ih), H = 2+C
H
2q q2 : It follows that V
H = q2 2+C
H
2q q2   2m if m < 12q2H;
otherwise, V H = 0: So V H = max(0; q2 2+C
H
2q q2   2m) always. With these notations, the optimal
mechanism of Conglomeration is summarized as follows.
Proposition 2 Under Conglomeration, a successful entrepreneur outlays dH = H+max(0; m
q
 
qH
2
); and the conglomerate is audited only in state 0, each project audited with probability lH =
2
q2R+2(1 q)S ; and Ms X obtains the net rent of V
H = max(0; q2 2+C
H
2q q2   2m):
3.5 Comparisons and the Equilibrium Mode
Let us put aside the mixed mode for a while and compare IF, which is equivalent to mode
(2), FI, and Conglomeration. First, by Assumption 3, m < (1 q)q
2RC
(q2R+2(1 q)S)S ; which implies H +
21
max(0; m
q
  qH
2
) < R
S
; that is, dH < dI : Therefore, IF is dominated by Conglomeration. We are
left to compare FI to Conglomeration. FI dominates Conglomeration if and only if dB  dH :
For this inequality, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 5 dB  dH if and only if CB  CH
Proof. 2qdX = 2 + V X + 2m+ CX for X = H and B: the accounting equation states that the
total outlays of the entrepreneurs exactly cover the investment costs (2) and the rent to Ms X
and the monitoring costs and the auditing costs. It follows that dB dH = V B V H+CB CH :
By Propositions 1 and 2, V X = max(0; q2 2+C
X
2q q2  2m); which implies that V B V H has the same
sign as CB   CH : Therefore, dB   dH has the same sign as CB   CH :
As CB = (1  q)2C2lB(m) and CH = 2(1  q)2ClH ; CB  CH if and only if lB(m)lH  2CC2 : As
lH = 2
q2R+2(1 q)S ; the inequality is equivalent to
2C
C2
 l
B(m)(q2R + 2(1  q)S)
2
(FI-C)
Then, by Lemma 5, FI dominates Conglomeration if and only if (FI-C) holds true.
Comparing (G10) and (G21) between the two modes shows the advantage of Conglomeration:
(G10b) is tighter than (G10h) and (G21b) is tighter than (G21h). The former has the same RHS
as the latter, but a smaller LHS, because d1  R (for (G10)) or 2d2  2R (for G21)). The two
inequalities reect the fact that collateral under FI (the bank asset) is always worth less than
that under Conglomeration (the pool of the projects), because the bank asset is always a part
of the pool of the projects. The higher value of the collateral leads to the less auditing needed.
Therefore, Conglomeration has the "Collateral Advantage". On the other hand, FI has the
number advantage, measured by 2C
C2
: (FI-C) shows that FI dominates Conglomeration if and
only if so measured number advantage is larger enough.
We turn to the mixed mode now. It is dominated by Conglomeration, by the following intu-
itive argument. The collateral of the mixed mode, composed of one project plus the intermediary
22
asset within the other project, is worth less than the pool of the two projects. Moreover, in case
of default, the investors still have to audit two assets. Therefore, the mixed mode, compared to
Conglomeration, has neither Collateral Advantage nor Number Advantage and is dominated by
it.
With the last mode dominated, the real race is between FI and Conglomeration. The equi-
librium mode is FI if and only if (FI-C) holds true, that is, the number advantage is larger than
the threshold T (m;R) = l
B(m)(q2R+2(1 q)S)
2
; which measures the collateral advantage of Conglom-
eration. Obviously @T
@R
> 0; intuitively, the larger is R, the higher is the value of the projects and
the bigger is the collateral advantage of Conglomeration. @T
@m
has the same sign as dl
B(m)
dm
; which,
by Proposition 1, is negative. Intuitively, the larger is m, the more is needed to pay the bank as
compensation, the higher is the value of the bank asset, and the smaller is the relative collateral
advantage of Conglomeration to FI. R captures the gross size of the projects and m captures
the degree of complexity, as it measures the expenses with which a nancial expert acquires soft
information on a project.
To summarize,
Proposition 3 The equilibrium mode is either FI or Conglomeration, depends on whether (FI-
C) holds true or not. The chance of FI being the equilibrium mode decreases with the size of the
projects and increases with the degree of their complexity.
We move on to compare FI with Conglomeration for the case of a large number of entrepre-
neurs. This is for two purposes, to check the robustness of the results of Proposition 3, and to
examine the claim of Diamond (1984) that FI is driven by the benet of diversication, which
is the benet of cross subsidization magnied by the Law of Large Numbers (LLN). The benet
of cross subsidization, we have seen, does not drive FI for the two-entrepreneur case, since it is
also implemented by Conglomeration. Will large numbers make any di¤erence?
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Intuitively, they will not. They deliver the same good under FI as under Conglomeration.
In the two-entrepreneur case, two costs come with the implementation of the benet of cross
subsidization: in state 0, auditing still happens since the liability to investors is not repaid, and
in state 2, Ms X obtains rent, since she is then paid by two successful entrepreneurs while one
payment su¢ ces to clear the liability to investors. Both costs are worn away when the number
of entrepreneurs goes to innity, because by the LLN, on average the number of successes is
almost xed, and hence both the probability of the liability not being fully repaid and that of
Ms X acquiring rents go to 0. This argument is independent of how monitoring is organized,
and hence applicable to both FI and Conglomeration. It shows that the two modes are equally
good under perfect diversication.
The next section provides a strict analysis and gives a necessary condition for FI to dominate
Conglomeration with large but still imperfect diversication.
4 The Case of a Large Number of Entrepreneurs
Now there are N entrepreneurs. Each has an identical and independent project. Ms X, the
provider of monitoring service, becomes either the bank that now nances the N projects, or the
headquarters of the conglomerate that consists of N division. The costs of auditing the bank is
denoted by CN : We assume CN = zN for some z > 0 and   1; that is, the auditing costs
do not increase faster than linearly with N . The economy has N + 1 states, state s = 0; 1:::N;
dened by the number of successful projects and occurring with probability psN = C
s
Nq
s(1 q)N s.
Note that the model is isomorphic to that of Diamond (1984). The auditing costs of this
model correspond to the non-pecuniary penalties: both are the deadweight loss incurred when
default happens, and in both papers, to avoid this loss by utilizing cheap monitoring service
is the driving force for the results. Diamond (1984), and the literature following him, only
compared FI to IF and showed the incentive costs to be worn out by diversication. This
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enables FI to dominate IF, which, he claimed, ensures the viability of FI. However, that benet
of diversication is also implemented by Conglomeration, as will be shown, and is thus canceled
out in the race between FI and Conglomeration.
What happens under IF is independent of the value of N . Particularly, in the case of large
N , a successful entrepreneur outlays dI = R
S
, as he did in the case of N = 2: Below for the case
of large N we rst examine FI and Conglomerate, and then compare the two modes.
FI
First examine FI, equipped with the following mechanism. ds = d; Ds =

sd; for s < k
kd; for s  k

;
and ls =

1; for s < k
0; for s  k

; for some k. That is, a successful entrepreneur pays the bank with d;
independent of s; and the bank repays what it receives to the investors up to kd and is audited
denitely in case of failing to fully repay kd: The liability contract of the bank is thus debt, of
which the total face value is F = kd: This mechanism is the one that was considered by Diamond
(1984). It is certainly incentive compatible. It is also partial collusion proof, because the outlay
of a successful entrepreneur is independent of the overall state, the report of which Ms X can
manipulate. The IR to the investors, (IR-I), is binding.
Lemma 6 If (IR-X) is not binding, the gross rent to Ms X is at most of order
p
N logN:
Proof. See the Appendix.
The gross rent is thus not su¢ cient to cover the total monitoring costs, Nm, when N is large
enough. Therefore, (IR-X) is always binding. It follows that each entrepreneurs outlay covers
exactly the investment cost (1), the monitoring costs (m), and the average auditing costs. That
is,
qd = 1 +m+
CB
N
(2)
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Here CB = PdCN is the total auditing costs under FI, with Pd being the probability of default.
Suppose Pd goes to 0 (to be veried soon). This, together with CN  zN; implies that CBN  0;
and hence by (2), d  1+m
q
:12 The (IR-I) is (1 Pd)F+PdQ = N+PdCN ; where Q is the expected
repayment conditional on default. As Pd ! 0; F  N: In this mechanism, F = kd: It follows
that k = F
d
 qN
1+m
: Then, by the Central Limit Theorem (CLT), the default probability Pd =P
sk 1 p
s
N  ( k NqpNq(1 q))  (
 m
1+m
q
qN
1 q ); which indeed approaches 0 quickly. Hence indeed
d  1+m
q
, which was the core result of Diamond (1986), namely that on average diversication
wipes out average incentive costs and leaves only technical costs (the investment costs and the
monitoring costs), and hence FI dominates IF: 1+m
q
< R
S
by Assumption 3.
The auditing costs under FI is CB  (  m
1+m
q
qN
1 q )CN :
Conglomeration
We move on to examine Conglomeration. In state s; the conglomerate outlays Ds if honoring
the contracts. If it lies that the state is t < s, then each of the s   t actually successful
but reportedly failed projects is audited with probability lt; and auditing any one leads to the
appropriation of all the projects, worth sR; otherwise it outlays Dt according to the reported
state, t. Therefore, the IC for the conglomerate not to misreport state s to be t is
(1  (1  lt)s t)  sR + (1  lt)s tDt  Ds (Gsth)
Note that even if lt is small, (1   (1   lt)s t) could still approach 1 if s   t is large, which
represents another advantage of Conglomeration for the case of large N . Let us call it "Spread
Advantage": since the collateral of Conglomeration spreads across the N projects, a lie with
a large a deviation (s   t) involves many misreportings, which makes the lie vulnerable to be
12Hereinafter, the notation y  x; sometimes denoted as y = x + o; means y xx ! 0 if x 6= 0; and y ! 0 if
x = 0: The notation y = O(x) means y  x for some  > 0; and y = o(x) means yx ! 0:
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detected. The larger the deviation, the bigger the spread advantage, which leads to the following
mechanism.
ds =

0; for s < k
d; for s  k

; Ds =

0; for s < k
kd; for s  k

; and ls =

ls; for s < k
0; for s  k

; for some k: For state
t  k; it is the same as that under FI. For states t < k; di¤erently, Dt is set to equal 0 to make
(Gkth) binding for any t < k, which makes maximum use of the spread advantage; dt = 0 is to
drain Ms Xs rent, as Dt = 0. This mechanism is partial collusion proof, since when the true
state is s < k; Ms X never lies that it is a state t  k; because she has no way to a¤ord kd, and
for s  k; the outlay of a successful entrepreneur is always d; independent of Ms Xs report of
the overall state.
For any t < k; (Gkth) is binding: (1  (1  lt)k t)kR = kd; which implies lt = 1  (1  dR)
1
k t :
These lt will be di¢ cult to handle. But notice that dR
1
k t  1  (1  dR)
1
k t  log(1  d
R
) 1 1
k t :
13
As we are interested in nding a necessary condition for FI to dominate Conglomeration, let
lt = log(1   dR) 1 1k t : As under FI and will be shown, d ! 1+mq : Thus log(1   dR) 1 ! log(1  
1+m
qR
) 1  : In state t < k; N  t projects fails, each audited with probability lt = k t : The total
auditing costs is thus CH = C
P
tk 1 p
t
N
N t
k t . It is less than NCPd; where Pd 
P
tk 1 p
t
N
is the probability of default.
As under FI, (IR-X) is binding.14 Suppose Pd and the average auditing costs, C
H
N
; go to 0 (to
be veried). Then, d  1+m
q
and k  N
d
 qN
1+m
by the same argument as for the case of FI. Thus
indeed Pd  (  m1+m
q
qN
1 q ) goes to 0 quickly and so does
CH
N
< CPd, as under FI. Therefore
indeed d  1+m
q
; which is the point intuitively obtained proceeding this section, namely that the
13That is because (1   x)  1   x    log x for 0 < x;   1: For the former inequality, let f(x) =
1   x   (1   x): f(1) = 0; and f 0(x) =  (x 1   1) < 0 for x;  < 1: Therefore, f(x) > 0 if x < 1: For the
latter, let  = x and f() =   log    (1  ): f(1) = 0; and f 0 = 1  1 < 0 for  < 1: Therefore, f() > 0 if
 < 1:
14Actually, the gross rent is of the order
p
N log logN; if (IR-X) is not binding. The proof is available upon
request.
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same benet of diversication is implemented by Conglomeration.
To compare Conglomeration with FI, note that CH < NC
P
sk 1 p
s
N
1
k s = NCPd 
E( 1
k s js  k   1)  CH : For the expectation, we have
Lemma 7 E( 1
k s js  k   1)! m1 q log 1 q+mm ; when N !1 and kN ! q1+m :
Proof. See the appendix.
The Comparison
FI has a chance of dominating Conglomeration only if CB is no bigger than CH ; which is
equivalent to CN  NC  m1 q log 1 q+mm by this lemma. Substitute (m;R) = log(1   1+mqR ) 1
and do rearrangement. The inequality is equivalent to
NC
CN
 [log(1  1 +m
qR
) 1
m
1  q log
1  q +m
m
] 1 (FI-C-N)
That is, FI dominates Conglomeration and thus occurs in equilibrium, only if the Number Ad-
vantage is beyond the threshold TN = [log(1  1+mqR ) 1 m1 q log 1 q+mm ] 1. @TN@R > 0 and @LN@m < 0:15
This conrms the robustness of the comparative statics results derived in the two-entrepreneur
case.
To sum up,
Proposition 4 When there are a large number of entrepreneurs, both Conglomeration and FI
implement the benet of diversication. And FI dominates Conglomeration only if (FI-C-N)
holds, that is, only if the number advantage is bigger than the threshold, which increases with R
and decreases with m, as for the two-entrepreneur case.
15 log(1   1+mqR ) 1 increases with m; and so does m log 1 q+mm ; since fm log 1 q+mm g0 = log 1 q+mm   1 q1 q+m 
log(1 + x)   x1+x > 0; where x = 1 qm : For the last inequality, let f(x)  log(1 + x)   x1+x ; then f(0) = 0 and
f 0 = 11+x   1(1+x)2 > 0 for x > 0:
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Note that limm!0 TN = 1. This, however, does not mean that when m = 0; FI never
dominates Conglomeration in any circumstances, but that it never if CN is in the order of N:
It can be shown that when m = 0; FI dominates Conglomeration only if CN is in the order of
at most
p
N .16 m = 0 is a very special case where (IR-X) is never binding; then the optimal
k is decided by the trade-o¤ between the auditing costs and the rent to Ms X, as for the two-
entrepreneur case (see the discussion following Lemmas 3 and 4).
5 Conclusion and Future Research
This paper proposes that the organization of nancing is decided by the allocation of the liability
to repay investors. It examines the economics of the liability allocation in a Townsend economy
with two entrepreneurs: it is costly to audit their outputs but cheap to monitor. The paper
analyzes all the possible modes of nancing, each dened by the according allocation of the
liability. The real race is between two modes. One is FI, where the liability is taken by the
monitor alone, who hence becomes the bank; the other is Conglomeration, where the liability is
taken by the conglomerate composed of the monitor and the entrepreneurs, the former running
the headquarters to monitor the latter. Conglomeration has the collateral advantage, namely
that its collateral is the pool of the projects, which contains as a part and is thus worth more than
the bank asset, the collateral of FI; the higher the collaterals value, the less the auditing needed.
On the other hand, FI has the number advantage, namely that in case of default, the investors
audit one bank asset under FI while many entrepreneur-projects under Conglomeration, which
saves auditing costs. So FI arises in equilibrium if and only if the number advantage is beyond
the threshold.
Furthermore, the paper compares FI with Conglomeration for the case of a large number of
entrepreneurs. The economy is isomorphic to Diamond (1984). Both Conglomeration and FI
16The proof is available upon request.
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implement the benet of diversication, which, therefore, does not drive FI, as Diamond (1984)
claimed and the literature well accepted. Rather FI is driven by the number advantage and
arises only if the advantage is beyond a threshold.
Both thresholds increase with R; the return rates of a successful project, and decrease with
m; the monitoring costs. As R captures the size of the projects and m captures how complex
they are, the comparative statics results predict that the smaller the projects, and/or the more
complex the projects, the higher the chance they are nanced by the bank.
The only di¤erence between FI and Conglomeration is in the collateral, derived from the
di¤erence in the liability allocation. In all other respects, the two modes are the same. Under
both, funds ow in the same way, passed by the monitor; the information structure is the same,
with each entrepreneur knowing of the output of his own, the monitor all the outputs, investors
none before auditing; and there are the same incentive and collusion problems. If FI is to be
justied from the cost side of Conglomeration, then this paper suggests that the costs must be
either specic to Conglomeration or better handled by FI. It is not obvious that such costs exist.
To consider liability allocation provides a general angle of examining the organization of
nancial markets. We can carry out an analogous analysis for each service that addresses certain
market friction, for example, the service of ex ante screening the quality of projects. The provider
of screening service can either sell her knowledge directly to investors and thus become the rating
agency, or use her knowledge to invest with investorscapital and thus become the bank. The
two modes di¤er, again, in who takes the liability to repay investors.
Moreover, to consider liability allocation may provide a new angle of delineating the boundary
of the rm and examining its nature. The literature starting with Grossman and Hart (1986)
and Hart and Moore (1990) delineates the boundary of the rm according to the allocation
of ownership of physical capital. This paper suggests that it be delineated according to the
allocation of liabilities to a third party, for example, the investors. In this paper, therefore, the
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entrepreneurs and the monitor are within one rm under Conglomeration, and are not under
FI. More generally, if party A takes (uncontractible) liabilities of party Bs work, then B is
an employee of A, while if B himself takes them, he is an independent contractor. Where the
incentive to avoid these liabilities matters, we may reach a theory in the manner of Grossman
and Hart (1986).
6 Appendices
The Proof of Lemma 3:
It su¢ ces to show the optimal solution without taking into account (IR-X) gives Ms X
expected gross rent of q2B; therefore, if q2B > 2m; (IR-X) is indeed unbinding. First let us
make up the two constraints that are unbinding and skipped in the main context. The IC for
the bank not to misreport state 2 to be 0 is
(G20b): l0  2d2  D2:
And in state 1, if Ms X arranges the partial collusion in which she gives  to the failed
entrepreneur to buy his silence when declaring state 2, she is not audited (l2 = 0) and obtains
d2 D2  ; which should be no bigger than d1 D1 for any  > 0 to disincentivize the collusion.
The partial collusion proof in state 1 is thus
(P1b): d1  D1  d2  D2
Note that (P2b) is binding in the optimization. Otherwise, consider the mechanism D1 =
D2 = d1 = 2d2; l0 = 1; l1 = l2 = 0: It implements the benet of cross subsidization, but gives no
rent to Ms X, which is impossible to achieve by Lemma 2. This mechanism is thus infeasible,
but it satises all the constraints but (P2b). The binding (P2b) is:
(A1): 2d2  D2 = (1  l1)(d1 + d2  D1):
It follows that (P1b) is not binding: d1 D1  jd1D1 by (LL)(1  l1)(d1 D1) = j(A1)d2 D2+
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l1d2  d2   D2. For the investorsproblem of nding the optimal auditing strategy, (G21b) is
binding; otherwise, they would lower l1, which only loosens (IR-Ib) of their problem (it tightens
(P2b), which they do not care, however). The binding (G21b) is
(A2) D2 = 2l1d2 + (1  l1)D1:
The entrepreneurs will choose d1 such that (G10b) is binding; otherwise, they would lower
d1; which loosens (P2b), and only tightens (P1b), which we saw is not binding. The binding
(G10b) is
(A3): D1 = l0d1:
Lastly, (IR-Ib) is binding:
(A4): q2D2 + 2q(1  q)D1 = 2 + C2[1  q)2l0 + 2q(1  q)l1]:
(G20b) is to be veried not binding. The entrepreneursproblem is:
Problem *: minB = qd2 + (1  q)d1; s.t. (A1)-(A4).
Substituting D2 and D1 of (A1) with (A2) and (A3) respectively, we get a link between d1
and d2: (1  l1)(d2 d1) = 0: Then, two cases arise, either l1 = 1; or d2 = d1: They are examined
one by one, and the latter rst.
If d2 = d1 = B; by (A2) D1 = l0B and by (A3) D2 = (2l1 + l0   l0l1)B: Substitute
these into (A4), we have B = 1
q
2+C2[(1 q)2l0+2q(1 q)l1]
2ql1+(2 q)l0 ql0l1 : Applying (
a+bx
c+dx
)0 = bc ad
(c+dx)2
, we have
@B
@l0
= 1
q
 2(2+q+ql1)+2q(1 q)C2l1(ql1 1)
[2ql1+(2 q)l0 ql0l1]2 : Obviously  2(2 + q + ql1)  0 and ql1   1 < 0: There-
fore, @B
@l0
< 0 and the optimal l0 = 1: Similarly, @B@l1 jl0=1 =
 2+(1 q)C2(3 q)
[2ql1+(2 q)l0 ql0l1]2 > 0, where
C2(1   q)(3   q) > 2 because C2  C  11 q ; the last inequality derived from Assumption
3: 2(1  q)C   (1  q)C  qR   (1  q)C  1. Therefore, the optimal l1 = 0: Substitute l0 = 1
and l1 = 0 into the formula of B, and we have B =
2+C2(1 q)2
2q q2 = d2 = d1; and into (A2) and (A3)
we have D1 = D2 = d1 = B:
If l1 = 1; by (A2) D2 = 2d2: Since D2  2l0d2 ((G20b)), we get l0 = 1: By (A3) D1 = d1:
That is, all the revenues paid into the bank is passed to investors. Then the LHS of (A4) equals
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2qB: As l0 = l1 = 1; the RHS of (A4) equals 2+C2[(1 q)2+2q(1 q)]: Therefore, B = 2+C2(1 q2)2q
in this case.
Compare the two cases. 2+C2(1 q
2)
2q
> 2+C2(1 q)
2
2q q2 , C2(1 q)(3 q) > 2, which has been proved
true. Thus, the rst case gives the solution of the minimization problem. Therefore, the optimal
mechanism, without taking into account (IR-X), is d2 = d1 = D1 = D2 = B  2+C2(1 q)22q q2 ; l0 = 1
and l1 = 0: (G20b) is satised. Ms X obtains 2d2  D2 = B in state 2. Therefore, if q2B > 2m;
the IR for Ms X is indeed unbinding.
Q.E.D.
The Proof of Lemma 4
It su¢ ces to show the optimal solution without taking into account (IR-X) gives Ms X
expected gross rent of q2H; therefore, if q2H > 2m; (IR-X) is indeed unbinding. First we make
up the neglected constraints. If the conglomerate reports state 0 in state 2, with probability
2l0   l20; one project at least is audited, and then the whole collateral, worth 2R; is lost to the
investors (here the implicit o¤-equilibrium assumption is that they commit to auditing the rest
of the collateral whenever uncovering a fraud on one project, in order to appropriate the whole
collateral). The IC for the conglomerate not to misreport state 2 to be 0 is
(G20h): (2l0   l20)  2R  D2.
The partial collusion proof in state 1 is the same as (P1b):
(P1h): d1  D1  d2  D2:
We rst pin down lH0 (D1; D2) and l
H
1 (D1; D2). (G21h) is binding, for the investors to minimize
l1; which pins down lH1 =
D2 D1
2R D1 : l0 is present in both (G10h) and (G20h), which implies l0  D1R
and l0  1 
q
1  D2
2R
respectively. Thus the minimum lH0 = max(
D1
R
; 1 
q
1  D2
2R
): Thus,
(B1): (lH0 ; l
H
1 ) = (max(
D1
R
; 1 
q
1  D2
2R
); D2 D1
2R D1 ):
We then move on to pin down Ms Xs rent. Let m1 = d1  D1 (the rent to Ms X in state 1),
m2 = 2d2  D2 (the rent in state 2), and V = 2q(1  q)m1 + q2m2 (the total gross rent). Using
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these notations, (P2h) becomes m2  2(1  l1)m1+D2  2l1R; and (P1h) becomes m1  m2 D22 :
mi is nonnegative by (LL). To minimize V , m1 = 0 and m2 = D2   2l1R: That is, (P2h) is
binding and (P1h), equivalent to 0   l1R, is unbinding. The m2 so obtained is nonnegative:
D2   2l1R = (2R D2)D12R D1  0 by (B1). Thus,
(B2): (m1;m2) = (0; D2   2l1R):
Lastly, the (IR-Ih) is binding. Substitute (B1) into the binding (IR-Ih),
(B3): q2D2 + 2q(1  q)D1 = 2 + 2[(1  q)2lH0 (D1; D2) + q(1  q)lH1 (D1; D2)]C:
(B3) implicitly denes a function D2(D1): f(D1; D2)jD2 = D2(D1)g is then the set of all
feasible securities. If the repayment in state 1 (D1) decreases, as compensation, the repayment
in state 2 (D2) has to increase, that is, D02 < 0: Here, and for the rest of the proof, "
0" represents
the full derivative with respect to D1.
Last, let CH  2C[(1  q)2l0+ q(1  q)l1] be the total auditing costs. Then the total nancial
costs consist of the investment costs (2) and Xs rent (V ) and CH . The entrepreneursproblem
becomes minD1;D2 V + C
H ; s.t. (B1)-(B3).
Lemma 4 asserts that the minimization happens atD1 = D2:AsD1  D2 is assumed, to prove
the lemma, it su¢ ces to show that (V + CH)0 < 0 everywhere. As l0 = max(1 
q
1  D2
2R
; D1
R
);
we consider two cases depending whether 1 
q
1  D2
2R
 D1
R
or not.
Consider rst the case where 1 
q
1  D2
2R
 D1
R
and thus l0 = D1R : To get an explicit trade-o¤
between the rent (V ) and the auditing costs (CH), notice that V = q2m2 = q2D2   2q2Rl1 )
q2D2 = V + 2q
2Rl1: And l0 = D1R ) D1 = l0R: Let l  ql1 + (1   q)l0 and substitute these
into (B3), we get V + 2q2l1R + 2q(1   q)l0R = 2 + 2(1   q)Cl , V + 2qRl = 2 + 2(1  
q)Cl , V + 2(qR   (1  q)C)l = 2: As l = CH
2(1 q)C ; it follows that V +
qR (1 q)C
(1 q)C C
H = 2: Then
(V +CH)0 = qR 2(1 q)C
qR (1 q)C V
0: By Assumption 2, qR 2(1 q)C  0: Thus (V +CH)0 < 0, V 0 > 0:
V = q2m2 and m2 = D2   2l1R = (2R D2)D12R D1 : Then, V 0 / m02 > 0; since @m2@D1 > 0, @m2@D2 < 0; and
D02 < 0: Hence (V + C
H)0 < 0 in this case.
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Consider the case where 1 
q
1  D2
2R
> D1
R
and thus l0 = 1 
q
1  D2
2R
: Then dl0
dD2
> 0, and
l00 =
dl0
dD2
D02 < 0: As V + C
H = q2D2   2q2Rl1 + 2C[(1   q)2l0 + q(1   q)l1] = q2D2   2qSl1 +
2C(1   q)2l0 (remember S = qR   (1   q)C), (V + CH)0 = q2D02   2qSl01 + 2C(1   q)2l00 <
q2D02   2qSl01: In order to show (V + CH)0 < 0; it su¢ ces to prove that q2D02   2qSl01 < 0. By
(B3), q2D02 + 2q(1   q) = 2(1   q)2Cl00 + 2q(1   q)Cl01: q2D02 is smaller than the LHS of this
equation, and the RHS is smaller than 2q(1  q)Cl01; as l00 < 0: Therefore, q2D02 < 2q(1  q)Cl01:
Then, q2D02   2qSl01 < 2q(1  q)Cl01   2qSl01 = 2q[(1  q)C   S]l01 < 0; for the last inequality we
applies (1  q)C   S = 2(1  q)C   qR  0 and l01 < 0 (l1 = D2 D12R D1 by (B1) so that @l1@D1 < 0 and
@l1
@D2
> 0). Therefore, (V + CH)0 < 0 in this case.
To sum up, the solution to the entrepreneursproblem isD1 = D2 = H: Accordingly, by (B1),
l1 = 0; l0 =
D
R
: Substituting all these into (B3), we have [q2 + 2q(1   q)]H = 2 + 2C(1   q)2H
R
;
which implies H = 2R
q2R+2(1 q)S : By (B2), m1 = 0;m2 = D2 = H: Then d1 = D1 +m1 = H; d2 =
m2+D2
2
= H: Indeed the gross rent to Ms X is q2H; therefore, if q2H > 2m; (IR-X) is unbinding
and the optimal mechanism is as specied above.
Q.E.D.
Hereinafter, psN is denoted as ps for simplicity, if without confusion.
The Proof of Lemma 6
The IR for the investors is binding, as follows:
(IR-I): (k
P
sk ps +
P
sk 1 sps)d = N + CN
P
sk 1 ps:
(IR-I) determines a function d(k):When (IR-X) is not binding, the optimal k that minimizes
d is decided by the trade-o¤ between the auditing costs and the rent to Ms X: auditing happens
in states s  k   1 and Ms X receives rent in states s > k:
To nd the rst order condition of the minimization, let us simplify (IR-I). Divide both
sides by N . By the Central Limit Theorem (CLT), s Nqp
Nq(1 q)  N(0; 1); with the dense and
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cumulative distribution functions being (x) = 1p
2
e 
x2
2 and (x) respectively. And let k =
Nq + h
p
Nq(1  q): Then, d(k) leads the following function.
(C1): d(h) = 1+
CN
N
(h)
q+
q
q(1 q)
N
(h(1 (h)) (h))
:
Given N; the optimal h satises the rst order condition
(C2): CN
N
(h)[q +
q
q(1 q)
N
(h(1  (h))  (h))] = [1 + CN
N
(h)]
q
q(1 q)
N
(1  (h)):
Remember CN = zN for some  2 (0; 1]: Suppose CNN (h) = o(1); which is obvious for
 < 1 and to be veried for  = 1. Then, the RHS of (C2) 
q
q(1 q)
N
(1   (h)): Suppose
hp
N
= o(1) (to be veried later), which implies that the LHS  CN
N
(h)q: (C2) asymptotically
becomes:
(C3): qzp
q(1 q)N
 0:5 = 1 (h)
(h)
:
Claim: The solution of (C3) is h =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
p
q(1 q)
qz
N0:5  + o
bh
 p(2  1) logN + o
if
 < 0:5
 = 0:5
 > 0:5
9>>>>>=>>>>>;
; where bh is
a constant:
Proof : If  = 0:5; (hb) becomes qzp
q(1 q) =
1 (h)
(h)
: limh! 1
1 (h)
(h)
=1 and by LHospitals
rule, limh!+1
1 (h)
(h)
= limh!+1
 (h)
 (h)h = 0:
1 (h)
(h)
is decreasing, since f1 (h)
(h)
g0 = (1 (h))h (h)
(h)
and (1 (h))h  (h) =   R1
h
(t  h)(t)dt < 0: Therefore the equation has a unique solution,
bh:
If  < 0:5; (C3) implies that when N ! 1; 1 (h)
(h)
= qzp
q(1 q)N
 0:5 ! 0: Thus h !
+1: It follows that 1 (h)
(h)
 1
h
; as limh!+1 h(
1 (h)
(h)
  1
h
) = limh!+1
h(1 (h))
(h)
  1jLHospital =
limh!+1
1 (h)
 h(h) = limh!+1
1
 h
1 (h)
(h)
= 0: Therefore, qzp
q(1 q)N
 0:5  1
h
) h 
p
q(1 q)
qz
N0:5 :
If  > 0:5; (hb) implies that when N !1; 1 (h)
(h)
!1; and thus h!  1; which implies
1   (h) ! 1: Therefore, qzp
q(1 q)N
 0:5 = (h) 1 =
p
2e
h2
2 ; as (h) = 1p
2
e 
h2
2 : Take log
operation on both sides) h2
2
 (  0:5) logN ) h   p(2  1) logN:
q.e.d.
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Let x = CN
N
(h) and y =
q
q(1 q)
N
(h(1 (h))  (h))jh=h ; so d(h) = 1+xq+y by (C1). Then,
x = o(1) indeed; for  = 1; x = O((h)) = jthe claimO(( 
p
logN)) = o(1): And by the claim,
y = O( hp
N
) = o(1): Therefore, d! 1
q
:
The gross rent to Ms X is VN =
P
sk d(s   k)ps: Apply the CLT, d  1q and k = Nq +
h
p
Nq(1  q); and let s = Nq+tpNq(1  q). We have VN  pNq(1 q)q R1h (t h)(t)dt: The in-
tegration equals (h) h(1 (h)): It converges to (bh) bh(1 (bh)), for  = 0:5; and   h
for  > 0:5 (h !  1); if a < 0:5; as h > 0; the integration is smaller than (h); which multi-
plied by
p
N goes to 0, as h = O(N0:5 ). Therefore, VN =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
o(1)
O(
p
N)
O(
p
(2  1)N logN)
if
 < 0:5
 = 0:5
 > 0:5
9>>>>>=>>>>>;
.
This gives the order of the gross rent to Ms X, which is at most in the order of
p
N logN:
Q.E.D.
The Proof of Lemma 7
As k
N
! q
1+m
; it su¢ ces to prove the lemma for N = k 1+m
q
: Let  = q
1+m
= k
N
: An intuitive
proof of the lemma is as follows. E( 1
k s js  k   1) =
pk 11+pk 2 12+:::+p0 1k
pk 1+pk 2+:::+p0
=
1+
pk 2
pk 1
 1
2
+:::
p0
pk 1
 1
k
1+
pk 2
pk 1
+:::
p0
pk 1
:
For given N; pk i
pk 1
=
Ck iN q
k i(1 q)N k+i
Ck 1N qk 1(1 q)N k+1
= (1 q
q
)i 1 (k 1)(k 2):::(k i+1)
(N k+i)(N k+i 1):::(N k+2) ; where C
i
N =
N !
i!(N i)!
is the number of combinations. Given that k and N are large, k 1
N k+i  k 2N k+i 1  ::: k i+1N k+2 
k
N k =

1  : Then
pk i
pk 1
 ( (1 q)
q(1 ))
i 1  i 1; where   (1 q)
q(1 ) < 1 as  < q: Then, E(
1
k s js 
k   1)  1+ 12+:::k 1 1k
1++:::k 1 =
1 

R 
0
1 tk
1 t dt
1 k ! 1  log 11  when k !1:
For a strict proof, we are going to show that for the comparison between limN!1E( 1k s js 
k  1) and 1 

log 1
1  ; both "" and " " hold true, so that they must be equal. For the "  "
part, note that pk i+1
pk i
= q
1 q  k i+1N k+i < qk(1 q)(N k) =  for any i = 2; 3:::k: The following lemma
is useful to establish "  ".
Lemma A2: If ai+1
ai
< ; then a1+a2
1
2
+:::ak
1
k
a1+a2+:::ak
 1+ 12+:::k 1 1k
1++:::k 1 :
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Proof: By mathematical induction. For k = 1, the inequality surely holds true. Assume
that the lemma holds true for a given k. Consider the case for k + 1: Let Vk =
a1+a2
1
2
+:::ak
1
k
a1+a2+:::ak
and Wk =
1+ 1
2
+:::k 1 1
k
1++:::k 1 : By the induction assumption Vk  Wk: Both Vk and Wk are a convex
combination of 1; 1
2
; :::; 1
k
; and are thus bigger than 1
k+1
: Notice that ak+1
a1+a2+:::ak+1
< 
k
1++:::k
; as it
, a1
ak+1
+ a2
ak+1
+:::1 >  k+ (k 1)+:::1; which is true because ai
ak+1
= ai
ai+1
 aI+1
ai+2
::: ak
ak+1
> ( 1

)k+1 i
for any i = 1; 2; ::; k: Then Vk+1 =
a1+a2+:::ak
a1+a2+:::ak+1
Vk+
ak+1
a1+a2+:::ak+1
1
k+1
> 1++:::
k 1
1++:::k
Vk+
k
1++:::k
1
k+1

1++:::k 1
1++:::k
Wk +
k
1++:::k
1
k+1
= Wk+1; where for the rst inequality we apply Vk > 1k+1 and
ak+1
a1+a2+:::ak+1
< 
k
1++:::k
: q.e.d.
By Lemma A2, E( 1
k s js  k 1) =
pk 11+pk 2 12+:::+p0 1k
pk 1+pk 2+:::+p0
 1+ 12+:::k 1 1k
1++:::k 1 : LetN and k =
q
1+m
N
go to 1 on both sides, and we have limN!1E( 1k s js  k   1)  1  log 11  :
To prove limN!1E( 1k s js  k   1)  1  log 11  ; let us restore notation psN for its sim-
plication ps: For any L < k;
pk 1N 1+pk 2N  12+:::+p0N 1k
pk 1N +p
k 2
N +:::+p
0
N
<
pk 1N 1+pk 2N  12+:::+pk LN 1L
pk 1N +p
k 2
N +:::+p
k L
N
; because the for-
mer is the convex combination of the latter and the smaller terms, 1
L+1
; 1
L+2
::: 1
K
. For this
inequality, keep L xed and let N (and k = q
1+m
N) go to innity. Then the left hand side
goes to limN!1E( 1k s js  k   1): The right hand side goes to
1+ 1
2
+:::L 1 1
L
1++:::L 1 ; because
pk iN
pk 1N
=
(1 q
q
)i 1 (k 1)(k 2):::(k i+1)
(N k+i)(N k+i 1):::(N k+2) ! i 1 for any i no bigger than the given L: Therefore, for
any given L; limN!1E( 1k s js  k  1) 
1+ 1
2
+:::L 1 1
L
1++:::L 1 : Let L go to innity, limN!1E(
1
k s js 
k   1)  1 

log 1
1  :
Therefore, limN!1E( 1k s js  k   1) = 1  log 11  : Substitute  = (1 q)q(1 ) =
(1 q) q
1+m
q 1+m q
1+m
=
1 q
1 q+m : Then
1 

log 1
1  =
m
1 q log
1 q+m
m
:
Q.E.D.
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